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rAbstract
We test the hypothesis that exits from the labor market for pre-retirement individuals
in Spain respond mainly to economic conditions and to incentives by analyzing two
effects. First, we test the existence of spillover effects from a reform of the old-age
pension system on transitions from employment to disability, unemployment and
inactivity. We exploit the fact that the reform only affected individuals that had
contributed between 15 and 25 years to the Social Security. Second, we estimate the
effect of business cycle (BC) conditions at the local, sector and national level on
these transitions. We find that both factors affect the exit timing and the choice of
route out of the labor market.
JEL classification: J21, J22, R23
Keywords: Spillover effects; Business cycle conditions; Disability benefits1. Introduction
During the 1970s and 1980s, European governments focused on the promotion of early
retirement schemes for older workers in order to generate job opportunities and re-
duce unemployment for younger workers. These events prompted a reduction in em-
ployment rates of older individuals and an increase in the financial pressure of the
social security systems which, coupled with the ageing of the society, triggered a shift
in the policy focus towards ways of keeping older workers active in the labor market
(Fischer et al. 2006). To achieve this goal, governments introduced several policies like
monetary incentives for firms to hire older workers or limitations in the accession rules
to the early retirement schemes. However, in many cases these efforts have not been
translated into increases in activity rates of older workers because many of them are
able to leave the labor market through alternative programs such as the disability or
unemployment schemes.
A number of papers have documented these unforeseen spillover effects from a
policy change in one Social Security program to the other schemes in the system. For
example for the USA, Duggan et al. (2007) show that a reduction in the generosity of
retirement benefits prompted an increase of the take-up rate of disability benefits. For
The Netherlands, Borghans et al. (2010) also find significant evidence of spillover ef-
fects between social security programs when they report that 43% of those aged 45 or
more that left the disability rolls due to a reform of the system, received an alternative
form of social assistance benefits two years after the implementation of the reform.2013 Jimenez-Martin and Castello; licensee Springer. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
ommons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
eproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
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searching conditions for older unemployed individuals increased the number of individ-
uals that used DI benefits as an alternative exit route by 2.5 to 4 percentage points.
Petrongolo (2009) examines a similar policy for the UK and also finds increased out-
flows from unemployment to disability benefits. Karlström et al. (2008) find that the
abolition of Disability Insurance as a path to early retirement in Sweden led the group
of individuals aged 60–64 to enroll in one of the other Social Assistance programs
available in the country. Finally, specifically for the case of Spain, García-Pérez et al.
(2013) found spillover effects from changes in the early retirement rules to the take up
rate of unemployment in the pre-retirement age range.
Therefore, identifying these spillover effects between Social Security programs is cru-
cial in order to ensure the effectiveness of policies that aim at keeping older workers
active in the labor market. We contribute to this body of literature and estimate a
difference-in-difference duration model to determine whether a reform of the old-age
pension system that was introduced in Spain in 1997 had any effect on transitions into
disability and unemployment benefits for pre-retirement employed workers. The re-
form introduced two main changes in the formula to calculate the old-age pension
which could potentially generate an “income” and a “substitution” effect. We test
whether individuals responded to these two policy changes by testing the existence of
the substitution (which gives incentives to continue contributing and exiting less to dis-
ability) and the income effect (which increases the previous incentives to join the dis-
ability rolls once the individual reaches the eligibility requirement).1
A second aim of the paper is to identifying the role of business cycle conditions in
explaining these labor market transitions for pre-retirement employed workers in Spain
and how the BC conditions possibly interplay with policies. In many countries (see
Benítez-Silva et al., 2010, for a comparative study), the disability and unemployment
programs have been often used to cushion recessions and to alleviate transitions into
and from economic inactivity in regions of high unemployment. In addition, disability
and unemployment programs have often been used as an alternative to early retire-
ment, either because of restrictions on early retirement itself, or because they offer
more attractive after-tax benefit levels, which is particularly true in the case of
disability benefits (Gruber and Wise, 1999, 2004; Jiménez-Martín et al. 2006; Blanco,
2000; Benitez-Silva et al2010). This alternative ‘route’ out of the labor market for older
people proved particularly attractive when employers were seeking to shed older
workers in periods of recession such as the early 1980s, early 1990s and late 2000s.
However, most of the literature that analyzes the effect of the business cycle on labor
market participation rates approaches the topic from a macroeconomic point of view
and time-series data is not enough to identify the causal effect behind an individual’s
behavior, as information on workers’ characteristics and choices is not available. At the
same time, the problem with microeconomic surveys is that they are not long enough
so as to capture the effect of the business cycle2 (Van Den Berg and Van Den Klaauw,
2001).
Therefore, the issue of the effect of the business cycle on labor force participation be-
havior has not received much attention in the literature due to the difficulty of combin-
ing macroeconomic and microeconomic data in a coherent way. However, workers’
participation decisions during expansionary or recessionary periods are crucial for
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1998). Notable exceptions for the case of Spain are Bover et al.,2002, Jenkins and
Garcia-Serrano, 2004, and, more recently, Garcia-Pérez et al., 2013. The first two
papers find that favorable business cycle conditions in the country have a positive
impact on re-employment rates of unemployed workers. The third paper estimates
transitions from unemployment to employment and from employment to unemploy-
ment for individuals below age 60. The model in this paper includes the regional rate
of growth of employment as a business cycle indicator, which in turn has the expected
sign.
At the same time, the economic environment also affects the performance of the
firms operating in the labor market and this effect is usually heterogeneous among eco-
nomic sectors and regional units of a single country. In order to capture this hetero-
geneity, in this paper we construct a number of business cycle indicators at the
national, regional and sector levels with monthly macroeconomic data and we combine
it with individual labor market information from a large administrative database
(monthly data also). This process results in a better identification of the causal effects
of economic conditions on individual’s behavior.
Our results show the strategic use of disability pensions by older workers ap-
proaching retirement as an alternative means of leaving the labor market when the eco-
nomic situation of the country deteriorates as well as the spillovers from reforms in the
old-age pension system to the disability scheme. In particular, we estimate that the pol-
icy change decreases the relative risk of receiving disability benefits (compared with
continuing in employment) by a factor of 0.45 for individuals that have contributed
15–25 years to the Social Security system. The implied disability benefits savings of this
reform amounts to about 19 million euros. When we include interactions between the
policy variables and business cycle conditions we also find evidence of the existence of
an income effect as more people that become eligible join the disability rolls. The vari-
ables that capture the effect of the business cycle at the national level also prove to be
significant in all the specifications of our model.
The structure of the rest of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the key pro-
grams available for older workers. Section 3 presents the data sources and the sample
employed in the analysis. It follows section 4 describing the econometric approach and
the empirical specification. Section 5 describes the key results from the analysis while
section 6 reports some robustness checks. Finally, section 7 concludes.2. Social protection programs for older workers (45–59)
There are two basic programs available for workers before retirement benefits are first
available at age 60: unemployment and disability benefits. In what follows we describe
briefly these two programs.2.1 Unemployment benefits
According to the current unemployment rules, there are two kinds of unemployment
benefits. The first one is unemployment insurance (UI) which is available for eligible3
workers that contributed while employed but that have been fired from the previous
job. After the exhaustion of UI benefits, unemployment assistance (UA) is available for
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scheme are entitled to receive 70% of the wages of the last job during the first six
months and 60% after that. These quantities are subject to a minimum and a maximum
amount. The minimum corresponds to 75% of the minimum wage and the maximum
is not fixed and is proportional to the number of dependents. These benefits are paid
for a period of one-third of the accumulated job tenure and are only paid for a max-
imum period of two years.
UA benefits are only paid to individuals with dependents and with an average family
income below 75% of the minimum wage. There is a fixed amount paid which corre-
sponds to 75% of the minimum wage. This benefit is only paid for a maximum period
of two years4. There is, however, an exception to this rule for people aged 52 and more.
They can receive 75% of the minimum wage until they reach the official retirement age
and the years spent under this scheme are counted as contributive years towards an
old-age pension (as the public employment agency, INEM, pays the contributions of
the unemployed)5, 6.2.2 Disability
There are also two schemes of disability pensions, depending on whether the disability
is temporary or permanent. If the disability is temporary and the risk covered is “com-
mon illness”, a period of 180 days of contribution to the system during the last 5 years
is required and benefits are granted for a maximum period of 18 months. After that,
the individual has to either return to work or enter the scheme of permanent disability7.
No minimum contribution is required for disabilities resulting from “work-related
accidents”.
For permanent disability situations, three levels of disability are identified which de-
pend on the severity of the injury/illness and which involve different eligibility require-
ments and pension amounts. Included in the first level (inability to perform the usual
job) there is a special provision for which workers with few qualifications, from disad-
vantaged socio-economic circumstances and who are older than 55 years8 are eligible
to receive a higher amount of disability benefits until retirement at age 65.
Between 5 and 15 years of contribution are required when the source of the disability
is an ordinary illness and the benefit base is calculated in the same way as old-age pen-
sions. No contributive requirement is needed if the disability is caused by a work re-
lated or unrelated accident or by a professional illness. In the case of a work-related
accident or professional illness, the benefit base corresponds to the average wage in the
last year of work and for a work-unrelated accident the benefit is calculated as the aver-
age annual wage for a 24 month-period that the individual can choose from the last
seven years of work. Permanent disability benefits are automatically transferred to the
old-age pension system when the individual turns 65 (Jiménez-Martín et al., 2006)9.2.3 Old-age pension system and the 1997 reform
One of our aims in this paper is to study the effects of a big reform in the old-age
pension system in 1997 on transitions in the labor market for pre-retirement individ-
uals aged 45–59. In this section, we briefly describe the characteristics of the old-age
pension system before and after the reform in 1997.
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system by at least 15 years and you can enter the system at the normal retirement age
of 65 if the individual does not have any job that requires affiliation to the Social
Security system10. The pension amount is calculated by multiplying a benefit base11 by
a replacement rate which depends on the age of the individual and the number of years
contributed to the system. Before the reform in 1997, at the normal retirement age of
65, the replacement rate was calculated as12:
0 if n < 15




The reform of 1997 increased the number of years used to compute the benefit basefrom 8 to 15 (one year increase for each calendar year until reaching 15 in 2003) and
the formula used to calculate the replacement rate outlined above was also changed to:
0 if n < 15
0:5þ 0:03 n‐15ð Þ if 15≤n≤25




Where n is the number of years contributed to the Social Security system. The aimof the reform was to provide incentives for older individuals to stay employed for
longer.
Apart from the reform in 1997, in 2002 there was another important reform in the
old-age and in the unemployment systems. In this reform, early retirement was intro-
duced at the age of 61 for individuals that had contributed for 30 years, that had been
registered in the unemployment offices for at least 6 months and that were involuntar-
ily unemployed. Before 2002 early retirement was only available at the age of sixty for
individuals who had contributed to the system before 1967. (See García-Pérez et al.,
2013, for an analysis of the effects of these reforms in transitions out of employment
and unemployment).
The reform also provided incentives for both partial and flexible retirement. For par-
tial retirement, the reform opened up the possibility to receive income from work while
also receiving a percentage of the old-age benefits. For flexible retirement, the reform
introduced incentives for individuals to retire after 65 as they could receive more than
100% of the regulatory base if they had contributed for at least 35 years to the system.
We check the potential confounding effect of this additional reform for our results in
the robustness check section.
2.4 Potential effect of the reform
As we have seen above, the aim of the 1997 reform was to provide incentives for older
workers (below 60 in our sample) to stay employed for longer. However, we distinguish
between two types of effects: an income effect and a substitution effect. The decrease
in the fixed part of the formula from 0.6 to 0.5 for individuals that just fulfill the eligi-
bility condition, that is, that have contributed exactly 15 years (n=15), can be
interpreted as an income effect which would provide incentives for them to stop
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is decreased from 0.6 to 0.5 (effect A in Figure 1). Therefore, in the empirical model we
will introduce a dummy variable to capture the effect of the eligibility condition for in-
dividuals that have contributed exactly 15 years before and after the reform. We expect
more exits from employment to the disability rolls after the reform for this group of in-
dividuals due to the lower incentives to stay employed and contribute towards the old-
age pension introduced by the reform.
Apart from this income effect, there is also a substitution effect, which is captured by
the second part of the formula. For individuals that have contributed between 15+ and
25 years to the Social Security system, the reform in 1997 introduced an incentive to
contribute for one more year to the system as the “prize” for this extra year contributed
is higher now; 0.03 after the reform versus 0.02 before the reform (effect B in Figure 1).
Therefore, we expect that exits from employment to the disability system will be re-
duced for individuals that have contributed between 15+ and 25 years after the reform
due to the increased incentives to stay employed introduced by the reform. On the con-
trary, the incentives for individuals which have contributed between 25+ and 35 years
remain unchanged by the reform as the new formula provides the same replacement
rate before and after the reform for this group of individuals. Consequently, we should
not observe any relevant change in their behavior.
With respect to the effect of the reform on exits from employment to unemployment,
it should be noted that the time spent receiving unemployment benefits are counted as
contributed years towards an old-age pension as the public employment agency, INEM,
pays the contributions of the unemployed. Therefore, both being employed and in the
unemployment scheme increases the number of years of contribution so that the incen-
tives of moving from employment to unemployment should not be changed by the re-
form. However, there is also a potential substitution effect for individuals that have
contributed between 15+ and 25 years and that would have otherwise moved from em-
ployment to disability before the reform. These workers could be willing to move to
unemployment instead of disability after the reform in order to keep contributing to-















Figure 1 Changes A and B of the old-age pension reform in 1997.
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contributed 15 years to the system, we expect fewer exits to unemployment after the
reform due to the lower incentive to continue contributing towards the old-age pension
form the unemployment scheme.
In order to develop an hypothesis of the type of effect that the business cycle vari-
ables can have on labor market transitions in our sample we make the distinction be-
tween work disability, which is likely to be influenced by economic conditions, and
health disability, which is affected by medical technology and demographic changes
(Benitez-Silva et al., 2010). We have reasons to believe that, for the group of individuals
aged 45–59 in Spain, the first type of disability is the predominant13. Therefore, we
want to test the hypothesis that disability benefits are being used to alleviate the effects
of economic recessions for pre-retirement individuals in Spain softening the rise in
unemployment rates during bad economic times. Thus, if the hypothesis is correct, we
expect to find a positive relationship between unemployment rates of the region and
sector of the economy and transitions into disability benefits and a negative relation-
ship between BC conditions at the national level (captured by the GDP growth) and
these transitions.3. Data and key empirical facts
3.1 Data
The study will use the Continuous Sample of Working Lives (Muestra Continua de
Vidas Laborales, MCVL) which is a microeconomic data set based on administrative
records compiled from three sources; the Spanish Social Security Administration,
the Tax Office and the National Census. It contains a random sample of 4% of all
the individuals who, at some point during 2007, had contributed towards the social
security system (either by working or being in an unemployment scheme) or had
received a contributory pension. The random sample selected contains over one
million people14.
There is information available on the entire employment history of the workers, in-
cluding the exact duration of all previous employment, unemployment and pension
spells, and for each spell, the firm’s sector and region of activity, the type of contract
held, the wages measured as contribution bases, the level of pension and unemploy-
ment benefits, among others. There is also some census information on personal char-
acteristics such as age, gender, nationality and level of education.15
The macroeconomic variables used to capture the economic business cycle are
constructed with information derived from the Spanish Instituto Nacional de
Estadística (INE).
We measure growth and employability performance of different economic sectors
and regions in Spain to capture the variation in the business cycle between times,
sectors and regions.
We only consider men in our sample as women have a more interrupted profes-
sional career due to maternity and we do not have enough information in our ad-
ministrative data in order to take all these additional issues into account. Therefore,
we select all employment spells of men in the sample between 45 and 5916 years old
and we follow them until they exit from employment or until they are censored
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of individuals who are unemployed, inactive or receiving disability pensions, as our
focus is on transitions out of employment.
As the process of claiming disability benefits may take some time so that individuals
may spend some time in inactivity or unemployment before they can fulfill all the ad-
ministrative steps needed to receive the disability benefits, we consider individuals as
exiting to disability benefits if they are observed as joining the disability rolls in the
subsequent two years after leaving employment17.
We have monthly observations from 1987 until 2005 and the sample selected
contains 163.394 spells of employment for 89.698 individuals. 57.610 of these employ-
ment spells end in unemployment, 4.038 in disability, 38.797 in inactivity and 62.949
are censored. The exit to disability is considered to be an absorbing state18. Descriptive
statistics of the variables used in the analysis can be found in Table 1.3.2 Aggregate labor market evolution of workers 45–59 in Spain
Figure 2 shows the way in which the inflow into disability pensions reacts to business
cycle conditions at the aggregate level in Spain as it plots the relation between the
number of disability pensions granted to workers aged 45–59 and the GDP growth. It
can be observed that there is a strong negative relation between these two variables so
that whenever the GDP increases, the number of disability pensions for this group of
workers decreases and vice versa.
At the same time, the number of new disability pensions granted has increased
strongly and continuously since 1997, the year of the old-age pension reform, even if
the fluctuations in the GDP were not that pronounced from 1997 and the growth of
the GDP almost stabilized at the end of the period.
Therefore, some empirical evidence seems to exist at the aggregate level about two
facts: first, changes in the number of disability pensions granted to the group of pre-
retirement workers seem to respond to adjustments in the speed of economic growth.
Second, the number of disability pensions granted to this group of individuals seems to
accelerate after the introduction of the reform in 1997.
In the econometric part we will differentiate between these two effects by including
two types of variables: the first ones will capture BC conditions at a more disaggregated
regional and sector level and a second group of variables will capture the effect of the
reform in 1997.4. Modelling framework: competing-risk hazard regression model
Our main purpose is to measure the effect of the old-age pension reform and of the
BC variables on transitions out of employment for older workers approaching retire-
ment. We use duration models to estimate these effects and we consider three po-
tential destination states once the individual leaves employment: unemployment;
disability and inactivity. Therefore, we use a competing-risk model in which the
discrete time hazard into one of the m states is equal to the probability of making a
transition in interval t, conditional upon surviving up to the beginning of the
interval.
Table 1 Mean and standard deviations
Men
Mean St dev
Covered wage 1345.9 706.91
High School dropouts 0.1999 0.3999
High School 0.5689 0.4952
Bachelor’s and Higher 0.2109 0.4079
Number Workers Firm 857.21 5445.5
Madrid Region 0.1704 0.3760
Catalonia Region 0.2085 0.4062
Mediterranean Region 0.1218 0.3270
Northern Region 0.2019 0.4014
Castilla (Centre) 0.1331 0.3397
South Region 0.1633 0.3696
Primary Sector 0.0158 0.1247
Secondary Sector 0.4710 0.4991
Tertiary Sector 0.3235 0.4678
Public Administration 0.0735 0.2584
Education Sector 0.0180 0.1331




Part-time Contract 0.0391 0.1940
Cohort born 1935-1940 0.1643 0.3705
Cohort born 1941-1946 0.3003 0.4583
Cohort born 1947-1951 0.2495 0.4327
Cohort born 1952-1956 0.1694 0.3751
Cohort born 1957-1961 0.0526 0.2232
Unempl Rate CCAA 15.510 6.4242
Unempl Rate Sector 6.9035 3.8634
GDP Growth 1.3152 1.0046
Age 52 0.0677 0.2513
Age 55 0.0570 0.2319
Age 58 0.0438 0.2046
#Observations 6.535.767
Men aged 45–59.
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individual i to destination m in interval t such that19:
hmit ¼





exp βm0 þ βm1 Xit þ βm2 Zit þ βm3 Wit þ θmt
  ð9Þ









































New disability pensions/year GDP real growth















Figure 2 GDP growth and new disability pensions granted each year to individuals aged 45–59 in
Spain, 1980–2008. Source: GDP growth: Spanish National Institute of Statistics, Number of disability
pensions granted each year to individuals aged 45–59: Own calculations from MCVL.
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polynomial. We have chosen this specification of duration dependence because, together
with the age dummies, it reproduces the shape of the empirical interval hazard rate reason-
ably close.20
For the given hazard rate described above, the individual worker’s likelihood contri-


















Where cmit is a destination-specific censoring indicator which equals 1 if worker i exits







exp βm0 þ βm1 Xit þ βm2 Zit þ βm3 Wit þ θmt
  ð11Þ




Our empirical specification consists of three types of explanatory variables: a vector of
personal and job characteristics, a vector of proxies of the state of the BC at the na-
tional, regional and sector level and a vector of variables that capture the effect of the
old-age pension reform in 1997 (apart from the three variables of the baseline hazard).
The first one includes a proxy for education21, characteristics of the current
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mination of the job) and region, cohort and age dummies at the key ages of the system
(at 52, 55 and 58)22. The dummy at age 52 will capture the effect of the special scheme
in the unemployment legislation explained above for which individuals can receive un-
employment assistance benefits until retirement. The dummy at age 55 tests the effects
of the special scheme in the disability system and the one at age 58 captures the stra-
tegic behavior of individuals getting the maximum of two years of unemployment bene-
fits and moving to early retirement at the age of 60.
The vector of proxies of the state of the BC includes three variables constructed with
macroeconomic data derived from the National Institute of Statistics. The first variable
captures the unemployment rate of each of the 18 autonomous communities in Spain.
We assign this value to each individual according to the autonomous community in
which they work at each point in time. Depending on the economic sector in which the
individual is reported to work, we also assign them the value of another variable that
captures the unemployment rate in each of the 17 economic sectors in which we divide
the Spanish economy. Finally, we also include a third variable, the GDP growth, in
order to capture national business cycle trends that are not captured by the regional or
sector variables. These macroeconomic variables are all varying over time.
In order to capture the effect of the old-age pension reform, we construct 7 variables
that will allow us to capture the differential effect of the reform for individuals with dif-
ferent number of years contributed to the system as well as a variable that controls for
the post-reform period. We distinguish from the variable that captures the eligibility
condition and that represents the income effect showed in Figure 1 and the variable
that captures the substitution effect:
CONTR15 ¼ YC ¼ 15
CONTR15POST1997 ¼ YC ¼ 15½   YEAR > 1997½  Income Effectð Þ
CONTR1525 ¼ 15 < YC≤25
CONTR1525POST1997 ¼ 15 < YC≤25½   YEAR > 1997½  Substitution E:ð Þ
CONTR2535 ¼ 25 < YC < 35
CONTR2535POST1997 ¼ 25 < YC < 35½   YEAR > 1997½ 
CONTR35 ¼ YC≥35
YPOST1997 ¼ YEAR > 1997
8>>>>><
>>>>>:
where YC denotes years of contribution. Therefore, contr15post1997 is the variable that
will capture the effect of the policy for individuals that have contributed 15 years to the
social security system; that is what we call the income effect. At the same time, the
variable contr1525post1997 will capture the effect of the policy for individuals that have
contributed between 15 and 25 years to the social security system. This variable identi-
fies what we have defined above as the substitution effect.
5. Results
We first focus on the non-parametric analysis by looking at the empirical hazard rates
derived from our sample. The empirical hazard for a given number of months is calcu-
lated as the total number of exits from employment in each month divided by the
population in employment at the beginning of that month. This summarizes the sample
probability of leaving employment at each particular point in time. However, for simpli-
city purposes, we present this information compiled by age instead of months.
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the other non-employment situations for men 45–59. The graph shows three peaks of
the hazard rate at ages 52, 55 and 58, which are attributable to the special schemes of
the unemployment and disability pension legislation outlined above. The mild peak at
age 52 is due to eligibility to unemployment assistance for older unemployed workers.
The age 55 peak is mainly due to changes in disability benefits. Finally, the age 58 peak
is explained because of transitions to early retirement at age 60 after two years in con-
tributive unemployment benefits (see García Pérez et al., 2013, for further details). The
rest of the graphs in Figure 3 present the hazard rates differentiated for exits to un-
employment, disability and inactivity. We can see the higher hazard at age 58 for exits
to unemployment, the acceleration of the hazard at age 55 for exits to disability and a
small peak at ages 52, 55 and 58 for exits to inactivity.
Table 2 presents the coefficients of the estimation of the difference-in-difference
competing-risk model. Due to the non-linearity of the model and the inclusion of inter-
action terms, we only discuss these results in terms of sign and statistical significance
of the coefficients of the explanatory variables. The size of the effects is discussed for
the variables of interest by looking at relative risk ratios (commonly interpreted as odd
ratios) in Table 3 and total changes in predicted annual exit probabilities in Table 4.
We can see in Table 2 that, for Spanish men, the policy proves the existence of the
substitution effect as it decreases exits from employment into disability benefits for in-
dividuals that have contributed between 15+ and 25 years to the Social Security system.
The results also show that the income effect due to the policy goes in the wrong direc-
tion as the coefficient for the eligibility condition is negative (and we expected it to be
positive) although the coefficient becomes insignificant when we restrict the sample to
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Figure 3 Interval hazard rate from employment to all other non-employment situations: men
45–59. Source: Own calculations from MCVL.
Table 2 Evaluation of the old-age pension reform in 1997 & business cycle variables,
Spanish male 45–59; coefficients
Disability Unemployment Inactivity
Covered Wages −0.0018*** −0.0011*** −0.003***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
High School −0.144*** −0.492*** −1.228***
(0.053) (0.057) (0.047)
Bachelor’s and Higher −0.103 −1.382*** −0.782***
(0.083) (0.094) (0.072)
Primary sector 0.163 −12.65*** −1.101***
(0.168) (1.015) (0.144)
secondary sector 0.205** −24.36*** −0.453***
(0.102) (0.620) (0.080)
Tertiary sector −0.0515 −17.85*** 0.0594
(0.091) (0.567) (0.058)
Education sector −1.070*** −15.65*** −0.492***
(0.304) (0.125) (0.164)
Social services −0.511*** −3.805*** −0.650***
(0.129) (0.447) (0.098)
Number Workers Firm 0.0001*** 0.0003*** 0.0001***
(0.000) (0.000) (2.07e-05)
Catalonia Region 0.203** 1.115*** −0.297***
(0.086) (0.209) (0.0788)
Mediterranean Region −0.0323 1.302*** −0.291***
(0.098) (0.202) (0.0762)
Northern Region (excl Catalonia) 0.682*** 2.157*** −0.0484
(0.079) (0.194) (0.0680)
Castilla: Centre (exclMadrid) 0.0991 2.261*** −0.253***
(0.0953) (0.195) (0.0750)
South Region 0.502*** 1.013*** −0.639***
(0.099) (0.208) (0.0862)
Duration 0.0560*** −0.046*** 0.0236***
(0.004) (0.002) (0.002)
Duration^2 −0.0004*** 0.0006*** −0.0002***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Duration^3 0.000*** −0.000*** 0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Part-time Contract −2.275*** −2.678*** −1.712***
(0.279) (0.395) (0.150)
Cohort born 1941-1946 0.324*** 0.838*** −0.342***
(0.083) (0.081) (0.0635)
Cohort born 1947-1951 0.832*** 1.558*** −0.605***
(0.118) (0.116) (0.0924)
Cohort born 1952-1956 1.096*** 2.632*** −1.140***
(0.162) (0.184) (0.131)
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Table 2 Evaluation of the old-age pension reform in 1997 & business cycle variables,
Spanish male 45–59; coefficients (Continued)
Cohort born 1957-1961 1.951*** 3.060*** −2.029***
(0.223) (0.212) (0.268)
Year Post-1997 −0.127 0.970*** 0.658***
(0.150) (0.181) (0.112)
Year Contributed=15 0.498** 0.0841 −0.0631
(0.224) (0.081) (0.140)
Year Contributed=15*Post1997 −2.644*** 0.130 −0.406
(1.026) (0.264) (0.369)
15<Year Contributed≤25 0.372*** −0.128** −0.0776
(0.129) (0.058) (0.0697)
15<Year Contributed≤25*Post1997 −0.796*** −0.322 0.0351
(0.157) (0.197) (0.117)
25<Year Contributed<35 0.0373 0.254*** −0.314***
(0.140) (0.083) (0.0933)
25<Year Contributed<35*Post1997 −0.063 −1.724*** 0.449***
(0.146) (0.204) (0.126)
Year Contributed≥35 0.0500 −0.625*** −0.0196
(0.132) (0.197) (0.142)
Age −0.799*** 2.083*** 0.379***
(0.203) (0.135) (0.146)
Age^2 0.008*** −0.019*** −0.004***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Unem.Rate CCAA −0.001 0.066*** 0.0449***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.0045)
Unem.Rate Sector 0.002 2.182*** −0.0628***
(0.009) (0.063) (0.0085)
GDP Growth −0.049* −0.295*** −0.397***
(0.027) (0.011) (0.0255)
Age 52 −0.182* 0.0624 0.215***
(0.102) (0.049) (0.0702)
Age 55 0.254*** −0.017 0.278***
(0.080) (0.054) (0.0806)
Age 58 0.056 0.218*** 0.447***
(0.084) (0.068) (0.100)
Constant 9.562* −73.11*** −11.22***
(5.33) (3.57) (3.777)
Observations 6,442,191 6,442,191 6,442,191
Log-likelihood −78823.93
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Note: The omitted categories for the dummy variables are laborers without a high-school degree for the education
dummies, public administration for the sector of the economy in which the individual works, Madrid for the regional
dummies and the cohort of 1935–40.
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sign for the income effect and the coefficient is very significant. We interpret this as
evidence of the existence of an income effect conditional on business cycle conditions.
Table 3 Evaluation of the old-age pension reform in 1997 & business cycle variables,
Spanish male 45–59; relative risk ratios
Disability Unemployment Inactivity
Year Contributed=15 1.646** 1.088 0.939
(0.369) (0.088) (0.131)
Year Contributed=15*Post1997 0.0711*** 1.139 0.666
(0.073) (0.300) (0.246)
15<Year Contributed≤25 1.451*** 0.880** 0.925
(0.187) (0.051) (0.064)
15<Year Contributed≤25*Post1997 0.451*** 0.725 1.036
(0.071) (0.142) (0.121)
25<Year Contributed<35 1.038 1.289*** 0.731***
(0.145) (0.108) (0.068)
25<Year Contributed<35*Post1997 0.939 0.178*** 1.566***
(0.137) (0.036) (0.198)
Year Contributed≥35 1.051 0.535*** 0.981
(0.138) (0.106) (0.140)
UnemRateCCAA 0.999 1.069*** 1.046***
(0.005) (0.006) (0.004)
UnemRateSector 1.003 8.862*** 0.939***
(0.009) (0.563) (0.008)
GDP Growth 0.951* 0.745*** 0.672***
(0.025) (0.008) (0.017)
Observations 6,442,191 6,442,191 6,442,191
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Note: We present only selected results for this model. The omitted categories for the dummy variables are laborers
without a high-school degree for the education dummies, public administration for the sector of the economy in which
the individual works, Madrid for the regional dummies and the cohort of 1935–40.
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between 15+ and 25 years is not significant.
Therefore, it seems that the policy is effective in deterring the entrance into the dis-
ability system for individuals with 15+ to 25 years contributed so that they can earn the
higher prize of contributing one more year introduced by the policy change and the
policy is also inducing an entry effect into the disability system conditional on the busi-
ness cycle by reducing the initial percentage of becoming eligible for the old-age
pension from 0.6 to 0.5. As predicted in Table 5 above, there is no effect of the policy
for the inflow into the disability system for individuals that have contributed between
25–35 years as the policy did not change the parameters to calculate the old-age pen-
sion for this group of workers.
In particular, we estimate in Table 3 a relative risk ratio (causal effect of the policy)
for exits to disability relative to staying employed of 0.451 for individuals with 15+ to
25 years contributed (holding constant the other variables in the model). So after the
policy, individuals in this group are less likely to exit to disability benefits than to stayTable 4 Total change in exit probability to disability benefits due to the policy
Years Contributed 15+ to25 Max-Min Unemp. Rate Sector Min-Max GDP
Change in Probability −0.19% 0.30% −0.14%
Table 5 Expected spillover effects of the reform in 1997 on transitions from employment
to disability and unemployment benefits
Departing State: Employment Disability Unemployment
Eligibility Condition (Individuals just having 15 years contributed) Increase (+) Decrease(−)
15+ to 25 years contributed Decrease (−) Increase (+)
25+ to 35 years contributed No Effect No Effect
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disability benefits due to the policy is −0.19% for 15+ to 25 years of contribution (see
Table 4).
With respect to the variables that capture the effects of the business cycle, the results
of the estimation confirm our hypothesis about the strategic use of disability benefits to
alleviate the effects of economic recessions for pre-retirement men in Spain. We see in
Table 2 that the coefficient for the GDP growth is negative and significant for men
(and this results holds in all of our specifications) suggesting that exit to disability is
also influenced by the economic cycle of the country as a whole. In Table 3 we estimate
that when the GDP increases by one unit, the relative risk of joining the disability rolls
decreases by a factor of 0.95. Similarly, the probability of receiving these benefits in-
creases by 0.14% when the GDP changes from the maximum to the minimum value in
our sample (from 5.6 to −0.4, see Table 4).
A further look to Table 2 reveals a positive relation between the unemployment rate
of the sector of the economy and entries into the disability system although the coeffi-
cient is not significant. Therefore, when there is a negative economic situation in the
sector of activity in which the individual works, he has a higher probability of joining
the disability rolls. In particular, we estimate that for a unit increase in the unemploy-
ment rate of the sector, the relative risk of entering the disability rolls increases by a
factor of 1.003 and our model predicts that the probability of going to disability benefits
increases by 0.30% when the unemployment rate of the sector changes from the mini-
mum to the maximum in our sample (0.1 versus 14.7). Both the unemployment rate of
the sector of activity and the unemployment rate of the autonomous community appear
to be non-significant in our specifications because their effect is already captured by
the dummy variables of the region and the sector of activity. Both unemployment rates
appear to be significant when we estimate the model without the dummies for autono-
mous community and sector of activity. However, we have included them in the model
because we wanted to test whether there is a time-variant effect at the regional and sec-
tor level apart from the fixed-effect captured by the dummies.
Therefore, we have seen that the hypothesis that we made in section 2.4 about the
potential expected effects are corroborated by our results both with respect to the ef-
fects of the policy as well as to the effects of business cycle conditions on transitions
into disability benefits. With respect to the business cycle, we have seen that the med-
ical requirements needed to access disability benefits are not as strict as to prevent
workers from using this route as an alternative to claiming unemployment benefits dur-
ing bad economic times. With respect to the effects of the policy change, we find that
fewer men in the pre-retirement years left the labor market through the disability sys-
tem after the reform was introduced in 1997 due to a substitution effect. This result is
true for men that contributed between 15+ and 25 years in the Social Security system
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of accumulating one more year of contributions. Simultaneously, we find that more
men that had contributed between 15–25 years joined unemployment after the reform
(as expected) as the years spent under the unemployment scheme are also counted as
contributed towards the old-age pension. Therefore, individuals can still benefit from
the increased prize introduced by the reform for one more year of contributions when
joining the unemployment rolls.6. Robustness checks
As there was another reform of the old-age system introduced in 2002, the first robust-
ness check that we perform consists in estimating the same competing-risk model ex-
cluding the years after this new reform in 2002 in order to make sure that we are only
capturing the effects of the reform in 1997. The second robustness check that we per-
form tests for any differential effect of the policy for different business cycle conditions
by introducing interaction effects between the policy and the state of the BC.6.1 Restricting the sample to the years before the 2002 pension reform
Apart from the reform in 1997, we have seen in section 2 of the paper that there was
another important reform in the old-age and in the unemployment systems in 2002.
Therefore, in order to be sure that we are only capturing the real effect of the reform
in 1997 free of the effect of the reform in 2002, we estimate the same competing risk
model but restricting the sample to exclude the years after the reform in 2002.
The results of the competing risk model with the restricted sample are presented in
Table 6 and we can see that the coefficient that capture the effect of the policy for en-
tries in disability for individuals that have contributed between 15+ and 25 years keep
their significance levels and have the same sign than the model with the full sample.
The coefficients that capture the effect of the policy for entries into disability for the
other group of workers are not significant (individuals that have contributed 15 years
and between 25–35 years). The coefficients for the business cycle variables have also
the same sign than in the baseline model.6.2 Interactions policy variables with BC variables
Finally, we investigate whether the effect of the policy is different depending on the
economic conditions of the region or the country. The aim of this section is to analyze
the possibility that the effect of the policy, in terms of affecting the incentives of indi-
viduals to join the disability rolls, would be stronger in regions and times with less/
more favorable economic conditions. We test whether economic conditions affect both
the income and the substitution effects introduced by the policy. Therefore, in order to
study the interplay between BC conditions and the 1997 policy change, we estimate the
same competing risk model but adding some additional interaction terms of the policy
and the BC variables.
The results are presented in Table 7 for the interactions between the policy variables
and the unemployment rate of the region. We can see that the introduction of the
interaction terms does not significantly change the coefficients and significance levels
for the policy variables of interest except for the eligibility condition. The results show
Table 6 Robustness checks: restricted sample; 1987–2002; coefficients
Disability Unemployment Inactivity
Year Contributed=15 0.285 0.0790 −0.072
(0.221) (0.082) (0.140)
Year Contributed=15*Post1997 −1.633 −0.222 −0.096
(1.037) (0.308) (0.374)
15<Year Contributed≤25 0.190 −0.155*** −0.096
(0.124) (0.058) (0.069)
15<Year Contributed≤25*Post1997 −0.610*** −0.407* 0.148
(0.228) (0.218) (0.133)
25<Year Contributed<35 −0.129 0.246*** −0.320***
(0.137) (0.083) (0.0931)
25<Year Contributed<35*Post1997 0.0744 −1.861*** 0.551***
(0.215) (0.225) (0.142)
Year Contributed≥35 −0.703*** −0.604*** −0.181
(0.225) (0.213) (0.169)
UnemRateCCAA 0.0095 0.063*** 0.041***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.004)
UnemRateSector 0.010 1.97*** −0.036***
(0.013) (0.06) (0.008)
GDP Growth −0.0616** −0.275*** −0.388***
(0.027) (0.011) (0.025)
Observations 4,627,689 4,627,689 4,627,689
Log-Likelihood −64053.78
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Note: We present only selected results for this model. The omitted categories for the dummy variables are laborers
without a high-school degree for the education dummies, public administration for the sector of the economy in which
the individual works, Madrid for the regional dummies and the cohort of 1935–40.
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eligibility condition do enter the disability rolls to take advantage of the increase from
0.5 to 0.6. This is a very interesting result as now all the expected effects that we had
predicted before the estimation are corroborated by our model. Furthermore, we also
see that the effect of the unemployment rate of the region implies a differential effect
of the policy. That is, for individuals that have contributed 15 years to the Social Secur-
ity system, the reform in 1997 had a smaller impact in times and regions with a higher
unemployment rate. Therefore, in times and regions with a higher unemployment rate,
the income effect of the reform was lower for exits into disability benefits23.7. Concluding remarks
In this paper we have investigated the labor market behavior of pre-retirement
employed workers in Spain. In particular, we have assessed the extent to which exits
from employment into disability benefits can be attributable to economic instead of
health reasons. Therefore, we explore the existence of spillover effects from a reform in
the old-age pension system as well as the effects of business cycle conditions on labor
market transitions from employment to disability, unemployment and inactivity for
men aged 45–59 in Spain.
Table 7 Robustness checks: interactions between policy parameters and BC variables: UR
Disability Unemployment Inactivity
Year Contributed=15 0.502** 0.0847 −0.0631
(0.225) (0.081) (0.140)
Year Contributed=15*Post1997 3.383*** 0.181 −0.531
(1.065) (0.533) (0.574)
15<Year Contributed≤25 0.378*** −0.129** −0.0751
(0.129) (0.058) (0.069)
15<Year Contributed≤25*Post1997 −0.800*** −0.378 0.238
(0.284) (0.297) (0.181)
25<Year Contributed<35 0.0412 0.253*** −0.313***
(0.140) (0.083) (0.0934)
25<Year Contributed<35*Post1997 0.145 −2.002*** 0.786***
(0.192) (0.270) (0.174)
Year Contributed≥35 0.0606 −0.629*** −0.0066
(0.131) (0.198) (0.142)
Year Contributed=15*Post1997*UnemRate −0.648*** −0.003 0.00667
(0.030) (0.028) (0.0256)
15<Year Contributed≤25*Post1997*UnemRate −0.001 0.0044 −0.0129
(0.0165) (0.013) (0.0079)
25<Year Contributed<35*Post1997*UnemRate −0.0168* 0.0208* −0.0225***
(0.0101) (0.010) (0.0076)
UnemRateCCAA 0.0036 0.0628*** 0.0522***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.0053)
UnemRateSector 0.0022 2.184*** −0.0632***
(0.0095) (0.063) (0.0085)
GDP Growth −0.0471* −0.295*** −0.396***
(0.027) (0.011) (0.025)
Observations 6,442,191 6,442,191 6,442,191
Log-likelihood −78806.08
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Note: We present only selected results for this model. The omitted categories for the dummy variables are laborers
without a high-school degree for the education dummies, public administration for the sector of the economy in which
the individual works, Madrid for the regional dummies and the cohort of 1935–40.
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economic information on business cycle conditions at the national, regional and sector
level derived from the National Institute of Statistics to estimate a competing risk dur-
ation model. We also include in the model some personal and job characteristics as
well as the diff-diff variables to capture the effect of the policy reform in 1997.
Our results confirm our hypothesis about the strategic use of disability benefits by
older workers approaching retirement as an alternative means of leaving the labor mar-
ket since both the business cycle variables and the policy variables prove to have the
right sign and to be significant. With respect to the policy variables, we find that our
hypothesis of the existence of a substitution effect is corroborated for individuals that
have contributed 15+ to 25 years and the hypothesis of an income effect for individuals
that become eligible is only confirmed conditional on business cycle conditions. We
find that the old-age pension reform of 1997 decreased the relative risk of receiving
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have contributed between 15+ and 25 years to the system. If we perform a simulation
in order to give a monetary value to this decrease in the inflow into disability benefits,
we estimate that the government saved approximately 19 million euros per year24.
When estimating the effect of the business cycle on entries into disability benefits, we
find that for a unit increase in the GDP, the relative risk of entering the disability rolls
decreases by a factor of 0.95.
The income effect of the policy only appears with the correct sign when we introduce
in the model interactions between the policy variables and business cycle conditions.
Therefore, the income effect induced by the reform is conditional on the business cycle.
Our results prove to be very robust to different specification tests that we perform.
Finally, from a policy point of view, we want to highlight the importance of taking
into account the spillover effects of reforming one Social Protection program in the re-
sponses of agents to other programs. In order to ensure the effectiveness of our policy
interventions, we need to understand the interactions between Social Security pro-
grams and take them into consideration when designing policy interventions.Endnotes
1We are aware that what we call income and substitution effects are non-standard.
As we shall define more precisely latter on, the “income” effect stems from the reduc-
tion in the pension points given to eligible individuals (those that have contributed 15
years) after the reform, likewise the substitution or price effect stems from the increase
in the pension points given for each year contributed above the minimum required and
up to 25.
2With microeconomic data, it is usually assumed that the duration of employment is
independent of business cycle conditions when the number of periods analyzed is rela-
tively small.
3They must have held the job for at least one year.
4There is also a special scheme in Andalucía and Extremadura for agricultural
workers who have been employed for 40 days during the year. They are entitled to re-
ceive 75% of the minimum wage for 90 to 300 days each year. The number of days de-
pends on their age and number of dependents.
5This rule was introduced in 1989.
6Furthermore there is a special unemployment subsidy for workers that have
exhausted contributive benefits and have 45 years or more.
7This is provided on passing a medical examination that determines the “permanent
disability” condition.
8The argument behind this special arrangement is the fact that this group of workers
is considered to be in a particularly difficult position for finding a new job.
9On average, in monetary terms, this corresponds to an average disability pension of
700.05 euros per month in 2005; an average old-age pension of 686.61 euros per month
in 2005 and an average unemployment benefit of 740.66 euros per month in 2005 (data
taken from the annual social and labor statistics from the Spanish Ministry of Labor
and Social Affairs).
10This condition was later relaxed in 2002 when partial retirement was introduced.
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work before retirement. This was changed to 15 years of work before retirement from
1997. However, this change was introduced gradually from 1997 until 2002 and it af-
fected all individuals in the same way. Therefore, we have reasons to think that this
change will not interfere in our results. See Boldrin and Jiménez-Martín (2007) for fur-
ther details of the Spanish system and the reforms undertaken.
12For early retirement (ages 60–65) the replacement rate is multiplied by a penaliza-
tion factor of 0.6 at age 60 increasing 0.08 each year until reaching 1 at age 65. This
was also changed in 1997 to a factor of 0.65 and a yearly increase of 0.07 (Boldrin and
Jiménez-Martín, 2007).
13We can see a graphical evidence of this hypothesis in Figure 2.
14For our analysis we take a 50% random sample of this Social Security data as the
original sample was too large to be managed.
15We do not include the self-employed in our analysis as they may face different in-
centives than employed individuals.
16We do not include individuals aged 60 because, at that age, they can already access
some early retirement schemes and this would constitute another possible exit route
which is not the focus of our paper.
17Therefore, we cut the sample in 2005 as we cannot observe exits after two years in
2006 and 2007.
18We consider disability to be an absorbing state because the outflow from the per-
manent disability system is 0.003 (0.3%) in Spain.
19We do not explicitly model individual unobserved heterogeneity as the diff-diff ap-
proach should already control for unobserved time-invariant differences between eli-
gible and ineligible workers (see Garcia Perez and Sánchez-Martín, 2009).
20We have also tried to estimate the model with a piece-wise constant specification
of the baseline hazard in order to allow for greater flexibility. However, many of the
duration variables were not identified for certain months as there was no exit observed
to one of the routes for that particular month.
21We use the professional category of the job (individuals with a degree, administra-
tive workers or clerical jobs) as a proxy for education because the education variable is
obtained from the Spanish census which is only updated every 10 years.
22See the appendix for a detailed description of these variables.
23We have also tested a model introducing interaction terms between the policy vari-
ables and the GDP. These interactions terms prove not to be significant for the group
of individuals affected by the policy and so results are not showed but are available on
request.
24The total reduction in the number of disability pensions was about 1778 (888.800 pen-
sions in total in 2007–0.19%). The mean disability pension was 760,71 in 2007 and it is paid
14 times a year, which gives an amount of 10.649,94 euros per person per year.
Appendix
List of explanatory variables
 Duration dependence: The baseline hazard is modeled as a cubic polynomial
function of duration.
Jimenez-Martin and Castello IZA Journal of European Labor Studies , : Page 22 of 23
http://www.izajoels.com/content///
2013, 2:8
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that describe the professional category of the individual, which act as a proxy of
the highest level of education completed. The first professional category includes
laborers, the second category includes assistants and administrative workers and
the third category includes individuals with a bachelor degree or higher.
 Regional and cohort dummies are also included as regressors as well as
dummies for ages 52, 55 and 58 to capture the effect of the special unemployment
and disability schemes available at these ages on transitions out of employment.
The dummy variable at age 58 is introduced in order to capture the effect of
individuals who have contributed for enough years to receive two years of
unemployment benefits at the age of 58 before joining the early retirement
scheme when they turn 60.
 Characteristics of the current employment: There is a variable that describes
the number of workers in the firm and two dummy variables that account
for voluntary/involuntary termination of the contract and partial/full time
employment.
 Employment history: We have constructed a variable that captures the number
of years that the individual has contributed to the Social Security System from age
15 until the time of the spell. This variable is used in order to construct the policy
variables.
 Covered wages; this variable is a double censored (from below and above) version
of the wages (see Boldrin et al., 2004). We have information about this variable for
each month that the individual is contributing to the Social Security
Administration.
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